

Message Text

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EUR/RPM:SJLEDOGAR
NSC:JTHOMSON (INFO)
OASD(ISA):MGEN BOWMAN
J-5:COL. PARRISH
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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USDEL MC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 113469

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP)

1. WE NOW URGENTLY NEED HELP OF EMBASSIES IN A FINAL
PUSH ON THE LTDP, AS IT ENTERS FINAL STAGES OF BECOMING
A CENTERPIECE OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. AT THE END
OF A FULL YEAR'S WORK, WE HAVE DEVELOPED, IN CONJUNCTION
WITH ALLIES, A COMPREHENSIVE EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP
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REPORT WHICH WILL NOW GO TO DPC PERMREPS FOR FURTHER
CONSIDERATION ON MAY 8, THEN TO DEFENSE MINISTERS ON
MAY 18-19, AND FINALLY TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE
SUMMIT ON MAY 30-31. US HAS TAKEN A STRONG LEAD IN
THIS EFFORT AS FOLLOW-UP TO THE PRESIDENT'S GUIDANCE
AT THE LONDON NATO SUMMIT LAST YEAR. BUT, MANY
NATIONAL RESERVATIONS STILL STAND BETWEEN WHERE WE ARE
NOW AND THE SUCCESS WE SEEK. WE MUST NOW MAKE A FINAL
EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT KEY OBJECTIVES ARE NOT DISTORTED
OR DO NOT ALTOGETHER FALL OUT OF THE LTDP REPORT.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO EXPLAIN OUR POSITION ON KEY UNRESOLVED POINTS, AND TO REQUEST THAT MISSIONS DISCUSS THEM WITH FOREIGN OFFICES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES AT NATO OFFICE DIRECTOR LEVEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ENCOURAGE ALLIED SUPPORT AT THE MAY 8 PERMREP

MEETING. AFTER 8 MAY MEETING, WE EXPECT WE MAY NEED TO ASK AMBASSADORS TO APPROACH FOREIGN MINISTERS.

3. IN YOUR IMMEDIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIED OFFICIALS, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE US SEES THE LTDP AGREEMENT AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS LAUNCHING NATO ON A WHOLE NEW COURSE OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION DESIGNED TO COPE WITH STEADY GROWTH IN WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES, AND TO PRESERVE CREDIBLE DETERRENCE/DEFENSE IN THE EIGHTIES AT POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE COST. IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REQUIRE NATIONS TO SIGN BLANK CHECKS. RATHER IT ASKS ONLY FOR GENERALIZED AGREEMENT TO PURSUE SPECIFIC MAJOR MEASURES IN CONCERT, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO LATER REFINEMENT OF COSTS, AVAILABILITY OF NATIONAL RESOURCES, AND WORKING OUT OF TECHNICAL DETAILS. THUS, WE DO NOT SEE THE LTDP AS COMMITTING
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NATIONS PREMATURELY TO MAJOR DEFENSE BUDGET ADD-ONS BEYOND ALREADY AGREED THREE PERCENT REAL GROWTH PER ANNUM.

4. THE KEY UNRESOLVED ISSUES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE US HAS PROPOSED THE ADDITION OR SUBSTITUTION OF PARAGRAPHS IN THE PORTION OF THE REPORT TO THE HEADS OF STATE CONCERNING THE NINE INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE, AS A MINIMUM, SUMMIT ENDORSEMENT OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY DEFENSE MINISTERS AND, IN SOME CASES TO RECORD SUMMIT APPROVAL ON RECOMMENDATIONS FORWARDED BY DEFENSE MINISTERS. EMBASSIES SHOULD SEEK SUPPORT OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS FOR THESE PARAGRAPHS AND SHOULD ASSURE THEM THAT US DOES NOT SEEK BY THIS PROPOSAL TO COMMIT ANY COUNTRY TO SPECIFIC BUDGETARY ACTION. SUMMIT ENDORSEMENT OF THESE LONG-TERM PROGRAM ELEMENTS WOULD SET IN MOTION THE NATO AND NATIONAL MACHINERY TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF ANY ADJUSTMENTS IN NATIONAL PLANS, WHICH WOULD, OF COURSE, BE SUBJECT TO NATIONAL REVIEW AND APPRAISAL. BUT IF WE FAIL TO GET HEADS OF GOVERNMENT TO ENDORSE THESE KEY PROGRAM ELEMENTS, IT WILL BE HARDER TO FOCUS NECESSARY FOLLOW-UP. FYI. LATEST REPORT IS THAT ONLY THE NETHERLANDS OPPOSES THOSE ADDITIONS. END FYI.

B. ALTHOUGH IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT SYG LUNS, IN

COORDINATION WITH PERMREPS, WILL WORK OUT AFTER THE SUMMIT ANY NECESSARY DETAILED CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION, STAFFING AND PROCEDURES TO COORDINATE AND MONITOR THE LTDP, WE BELIEVE THE REPORT ITSELF SHOULD GIVE THE SYG STRONG BACKING FOR THIS TASK, AND SHOULD SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE A FEW KEY MEASURES. IN EACH OF THE

KEY PROGRAM AREAS WHERE NATO IS PLOWING NEW GROUND, WE SHOULD CLEARLY ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY TO SOMEONE
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IN NATO, PREFERABLY A MAJOR NATO COMMANDER (MNC), TO COORDINATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES CALLED FOR AND TO REPORT PROGRESS TO MINISTERS. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN NEW MACHINERY OR STAFFING WOULD BE REQUIRED. MOREOVER, OUR UNFORTUNATE USE OF TERM "SINGLE MANAGER" IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS PROBABLY RAISED NATIONAL FEARS OF GIVING MNCS MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY OVER NATIONAL PROGRAMS. EMBASSIES SHOULD REASSURE ALLIES THAT THIS IS NOT WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND. THEREFORE, WE HAVE CHANGED THE TITLE OF THIS FUNCTION FROM "MANAGER" TO "COORDINATOR." BUT WE FEEL THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF ONE DESIGNATED AUTHORITY AS COORDINATOR IN SUCH AREAS AS MARITIME FORCES, AIR DEFENSE, C3, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE IS ESSENTIAL TO ANY COORDINATED PROGRESS TOWARD THESE KEY PROGRAMS IN WHICH COOPERATION BETWEEN ALLIES IS ESSENTIAL.

C. WE ALSO SEEK ALLIED SUPPORT FOR EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING IN THE REPORT NATO'S NEW FOCUS ON CONSUMER LOGISTICS BY (1) CREATION OF A POST OF ASSISTANT SYG FOR LOGISTICS AND OTHER MATTERS AND BY STRENGTHENING LOGISTICS STAFF SUPPORT AT NATO HEADQUARTERS AND WITHIN NATO MILITARY COMMANDS; (2) ESTABLISHING A MODEST "LOGISTICS COMMAND" UNDER HEADQUARTERS AFCENT; AND (3) AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE THAT AN AFCENT COMMAND-CONTROLLED STOCK OF SELECTED AMMUNITION ITEMS, REPRESENTING AN ADDITIONAL 7 DAYS' SUPPLY, SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE MID-TERM WITH SIMILAR PROVISIONS CONSIDERED SUBSEQUENTLY FOR AFNORTH, AFSOUTH, AND THE MARITIME COMMANDS. THE 7-DAY AFCENT WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS STOCKPILE WOULD BE PROVIDED BY AFCENT COUNTRIES TO GIVE CINCENT FLEXIBILITY IN THE ALLOCATING MUNITIONS AND TO PROMOTE BADLY NEEDED
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INTERCHANGEABILITY OF KEY MUNITIONS IN THE CENTER REGION. THE US WOULD MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STOCKPILE. OUR POSITION FAVORING A "LOGISTICS COMMAND" FOR AFCENT, RATHER THAN A "LIMITED

LOGISTICS COORDINATING CAPABILITY", DOES NOT ENVISAGE AN ELABORATE NEW COMMAND, BUT RATHER A STRENGTHENING AND EXTENDING OF AFCENT'S ROLE BY ADDING SOMETHING MORE THAN A FEW STAFF OFFICERS. EMBASSIES SHOULD POINT OUT TO ALLIES THAT THESE MEASURES ARE IN FACT VERY LOW COST STEPS TO PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE WITH MORE COORDINATED LOGISTICS PLANNING-- WITHOUT WHICH ALL OF OUR EXPENSIVE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS MAKE VERY LITTLE SENSE. THESE STEPS ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE US IF IT IS TO PROVIDE THE

THE ACCELERATED REINFORCEMENT CALLED FOR BY LTDP.
D. THE US HAS AGREED TO TAKE A NUMBER OF ACTIONS TO ACCELERATE THE MOVEMENT AND IMPROVE THE READINESS OF US REINFORCEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ARE CONSIDERING RECATEGORIZING THREE ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS AND A CORPS HEADQUARTERS FOR AN AFCENT RESERVE CORPS IN NORTHAG. THE REPORT ALSO DISCUSSES THE PREPOSITIONING OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT FOR THESE THREE ADDITIONAL US DIVISIONS IN THE CENTRAL REGION BY 1982. BUT WE CANNOT PROVIDE REINFORCEMENTS THAT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY BECAUSE SEVERAL ALLIES ARE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE SAME RAILROADS, ROADS, AIRPORTS, AND IN SOME CASES PORTS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE COORDINATION. ALLIES MUST HELP US CONVINCE CONGRESS TO PROVIDE THE RESOURCES FOR PREPOSITIONING EQUIPMENT BY PROVIDING PREPOSITION AND RECEPTION FACILITIES AND BY AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RESERVE BRIGADES IN THE LONG-TERM TO GIVE GREATER DEPTH TO THE FORWARD DEFENSE. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT "IN THE LONG-TERM" MEANS AFTER 1985. THE RECOMMENDED LIST IS AS FOLLOWS: BELGIUM - 1 BRIGADE,
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DENMARK - 2 BATTALIONS, GERMANY - 3 BRIGADES, ITALY - 1 BRIGADE, NETHERLANDS - 1 BRIGADE, PORTUGAL - 1 BRIGADE, TURKEY - 2 BRIGADES, UNITED KINGDOM - 1 BRIGADE. IN SHORT, WE SEE ALLIED AGREEMENT AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE TO MORE RESERVE FORCES AS ESSENTIALLY A QUID PRO QUO FOR CONVINCING CONGRESS THE ALLIES ARE DOING THEIR SHARE TOO.

3. IN ADDITION TO GENERAL ISSUES DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS SHOULD BE RAISED BY THE EMBASSIES INDICATED:

A. FOR EMBASSY OTTAWA - SEPTTEL APPLIES.

B. FOR EMBASSY HAGUE - YOU SHOULD URGE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND DUTCH BRIGADE. DUTCH CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND BRIGADE IS

NOT NECESSARY SINCE FRG THIRD DIVISION IS
DEPLOYED IN AREA. THIS IS A HEAD IN THE SAND
RATIONALE SINCE FRG DIVISION MUST BE AVAILABLE
FOR DEPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE AS NEEDED -- AND EVEN WITH
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FRG DIVISION IN THE AREA,
THE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY IS MARGINAL. NETHERLANDS ALSO
HAS EVIDENCED A SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON
DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL RESERVE BRIGADES, AND SHOULD
BE ENCOURAGED TO BE MORE POSITIVE (PARA 2D ABOVE). THIRD,
WHILE OTHER ALLIES COOPERATED IN MODIFYING OUR PROPOSED

PARAGRAPHS IN THE SUMMIT REPORT (PARA 2A ABOVE),
NETHERLANDS ASSUMED AN ADVERSARY POSITION AND FOOT-
NOTED ALL EXCEPT THE ONE ON AIR DEFENSE ON THE
BASIS THAT MINISTERS SHOULD REFER PROGRAMS TO
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THE SUMMIT STRICTLY ON THEIR OWN MERITS. THIS
RATIONALE WOULD NECESSITATE REACHING AGREEMENT WITHIN
NATO ON THE RELATIVE PRIORITIES OF THE NINE PROGRAMS,
A DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TASK, AND BY INFERENCE
WOULD INDICATE THAT THOSE NOT MENTIONED LACK MERIT.

C. FOR EMBASSY BONN - SEEK FRG SUPPORT FOR
STRONGER LANGUAGE IN THE REPORT ON FORWARD STATIONING
OF THE NETHERLANDS BRIGADE (SEE 3B ABOVE). WE
RECEIVED ONLY TENTATIVE FRG SUPPORT AT 2 MAY EWG
MEETING, AND WE BELIEVE THAT FRG WILL SUPPORT LANGUAGE
TO ADVANCE THE PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, THE FRG REP DID
NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS AND COULD NOT FORMALLY JOIN
US. YOU SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR
ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS (PARA 2B ABOVE) AND
LOGISTICS RECOMMENDATIONS (PARA 2C ABOVE) ON WHICH
FRG HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY STICKY. LASTLY, WE WANT FRG
TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING ON COOPERATIVE C3 PROGRAMS
(ANNEX F OF LTDP) AS VITAL TO FLEXIBLE USE OF ALLIED
FORCES WHENEVER DEPLOYED. SACEUR AND SACLANT HAVE
REPEATEDLY SAID BETTER C3 IS THEIR SINGLE HIGHEST
PRIORITY; WE HAVE TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING FRG
HESITATIONS.

D. FOR EMBASSY ROME - SEPTTEL APPLIES.

E. FOR EMBASSY LONDON - URGE STRONG SUPPORT FOR
ADEQUATE LANGUAGE ON COOPERATIVE EFFORTS ON
ARMAMENTS, PARTICULARLY ON THE SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT
OR IDENTIFICATION OF FAMILIES OF WEAPONS. THE
UK REP AT THE 2 MAY EWG MEETING INTRODUCED WEAKENING
FOOTNOTES ON THESE AND OTHER COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS IN LTDP, WHICH WE REGARD AS DISTINCTLY
UNHELPFUL AND OBFUSCATING. WE ALSO URGE UK JOIN US IN
STRONGER LANGUAGE ON DUTCH BRIGADE FORWARD IN ANNEX A,

IN ORDER KEEP HEAT ON DUTCH. WE ALSO ARE STILL
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MOST DISAPPOINTED WITH UK RESERVATIONS ON C3 ANNEX,
WHICH IS SPRINKLED WITH UNHELPFUL UK FOOTNOTES. IF
UK IS UNWILLING TO GIVE ON THESE MATTERS, AT LEAST
URGE THEM TO EXPLAIN TO US WHAT ALL THEIR RESER-
VATIONS MEAN. LASTLY, GIVEN US/UK MEETING OF MINDS
AT BROWN/MULLEY MEETINGS, WE FEEL ENTITLED TO
APPEAL TO UK TO GIVE US STRONGER SUPPORT IN DEFEATING
OTHER ALLIED RESERVATIONS, FONOFF AS WELL AS MOD.

F. FOR EMBASSY BRUSSELS - IN ADDITION TO MAKING
GENERAL POINTS IN PARAS 1-4 ABOVE, PLEASE SEEK ADVICE
FROM USNATO ON DESIRED POINTS TO BE MADE WITH
BELGIAN FONOFF AS WE ARE NOT FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE
HERE ABOUT BELGIAN RESERVATIONS.

CHRISTOPHER

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